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Interpreting others actions relies on an understanding of their current mental state. Emerging research has begun to identify a number of factors that
give rise to individual differences in this ability. We report an event-related brain potential study where participants (N¼28) read contexts that described
a character having a true belief (TB) or false belief (FB) about an objects location. A second sentence described where that character would look for the
object. Critically, this sentence included a sentence-final noun that was either consistent or inconsistent with the characters belief. Participants also
completed the Empathy Quotient questionnaire. Analysis of the N400 revealed that when the character held a TB about the objects location, the N400
waveform was more negative-going for belief inconsistent vs belief consistent critical words. However, when the character held an FB about the objects
location the opposite pattern was found. Intriguingly, correlations between the N400 inconsistency effect and individuals empathy scores showed a
significant correlation for FB but not TB. This suggests that people who are high in empathy can successfully interpret events according to the
characters FB, while low empathizers bias their interpretation of events to their own egocentric view.
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INTRODUCTION
Understanding others’ beliefs, desires and intentions is a vital part of
successful everyday social interaction (termed Theory of Mind, ToM).
Typically, children develop these important social skills between the
ages of 2 and 7 years old (Wellman et al., 2001). Failures to infer
others’ mental states are attributed to severe interference from one’s
own knowledge of reality, and difficulties inhibiting the egocentric
perspective (Wellman and Bartsch, 1988; Flavell et al., 1990; de
Villiers and Pyers, 2002). A common paradigm to assess ToM is the
false belief (FB) task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), where participants are
introduced into two characters: Sally and Anne. Sally puts a marble
into her basket then goes out for a walk. In Sally’s absence Anne takes
the marble out of the basket, and puts it into her box. Participants
must then answer test questions that require them to either infer Sally’s
FB (‘where will Sally look for the marble?’) or to recall the narrative
reality (‘where is the marble really?’). This task requires individuals to
see things from someone else’s point of view (known as ‘perspective-
taking’), and relies heavily on ToM abilities to understand other peo-
ples’ mental states (which might be different from one’s own), and
how this might affect the other person’s knowledge, beliefs and actions.
In contrast to children, adults do not typically make errors on this task
when traditional response-based measures are employed (i.e. ques-
tion–answer), implying that they do not suffer interference from
their own knowledge of reality. However, when more sensitive meas-
ures are used (e.g. reaction times, eye-tracking and brain responses),
even healthy adults experience difficulties in considering other peoples’
perspectives (Mitchell et al., 1996; Birch and Bloom, 2007). This study
examines the electrophysiological basis of the ability to understand
events according to others’ (false) beliefs, and explores for the first
time how this is modulated by individual differences in social skills,
namely the ability to empathize with others. Empathy is a multidi-
mensional term, with some researchers conceptualizing empathy as an
affective/emotional response to another’s mental state (e.g. Stotland,
1969), while others have viewed it in terms of the cognitive mechan-
isms that enable us to understand others’ perspectives (Dymond,
1949). The cognitive conceptualization of empathy therefore overlaps
with ToM, in that considering other peoples’ minds is central to both
and is therefore likely to influence FB reasoning in this study.
Contemporary measures of empathy incorporate constructs from
both of these dimensions, treating them as distinct but related sub-
scales, thereby providing an overarching and integrated approach to
empathy (see Davis, 1983; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004).
Traditionally, research on ToM has examined the underlying pro-
cesses at group-level, assuming that healthy adults perform in similar
ways on these tasks. However, emerging research has begun to identify
a number of key factors that give rise to individual differences in ToM
ability, including mood (Converse et al., 2008), social relationships
(Savitsky et al., 2011), cultural background (Wu and Keysar, 2007),
autistic traits (Brunye et al., 2012; Kessler and Wang, 2012), and ex-
ecutive function skills such as working memory and inhibitory control
(e.g. German and Hehman, 2006; Brown-Schmidt, 2009;Lin et al.,
2010). Though no studies to date have explicitly examined how indi-
vidual differences in empathy might predict one’s ability to interpret
events according to others’ (false) beliefs, existing evidence provides a
number of reasons to suggest that such a relationship might exist. As
described above, empathy is conceptually very similar to ToM with a
related affective dimension, and has been described as an emotion-
specific mentalizing ToM ability (Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 2000).
Indeed, both ToM and empathy rely on a related network of executive
functions, including working memory (e.g. Morelli and Lieberman,
2013), and both have been shown to be automatically activated (to
some degree) in response to social stimuli even in the absence of task-
cues to keep track of others’ mental states (e.g. Morelli and Lieberman,
2013; Schneider et al., 2014). Second, neuroimaging research has re-
vealed that making inferences about the mental and emotional states of
story characters activates overlapping neuronal networks, including the
medial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction and temporal poles
(Vo¨llm et al., 2006). Differences in brain activity between the two are
thought to reflect the need to infer causality and intentions in ToM,
and emotional processing in empathy. Third, clinical groups who show
impairments on ToM tasks (e.g. individuals with autism spectrum
disorders, schizophrenia and psychopathy) also show a reduced ability
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to empathize, and lower scores on tests of empathy (e.g. Baron-Cohen
and Wheelwright, 2004; Blair, 2005; Bora et al., 2008). Moreover, spe-
cific patterns of ToM/empathizing deficits distinguish the different
conditions, with impaired ToM more strongly related to autism, and
impaired affective empathy predicting psychopathy (e.g. Jones et al.,
2010; O’Nions et al., 2014). We aim to examine the degree to which
empathy predicts the ability to process unfolding events according to
other’s beliefs in a healthy adult population.
While a great deal of research has been conducted to assess peoples’
explicit responses to questions that probe understanding of FBs (e.g.
Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Hogrefe et al.,
1986; Birch and Bloom, 2007), it is only recently that more sensitive
implicit methods have enabled an exploration of the cognitive pro-
cesses that underlie such decisions. For example, reaction time and
eye-tracking techniques have demonstrated the speed with which
belief inferences can be made, and have revealed the self/other biases
that people display under different conditions (e.g. Apperly et al., 2006;
Back and Apperly, 2010; Ferguson et al., 2010; Kova´cs et al., 2010;
Rubio-Ferna´ndez and Glucksberg, 2011; Ferguson and Breheny,
2012; Schneider et al., 2012). Further, a growing body of research
has used electrophysiological methods (i.e. event-related brain poten-
tials, ERPs) to examine how FBs are reflected in the brain’s electrical
signal. The majority of these studies have examined the brain’s re-
sponse as participants answer explicit belief questions (e.g. ‘where
does X think the Y is?’), and have demonstrated a frontally distributed
late slow wave (LSW) when people are required to reason about others’
(false) beliefs vs reality (e.g. Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004;
Wang et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2009). This difference is thought to
reflect the key processes that distinguish mental states from reality
(Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004), including the experience
of conflicting perspectives, and the need to inhibit the self-perspective
when inferring others’ beliefs (Zhang et al., 2009). More recent studies
have examined ToM under more implicit conditionswhile partici-
pants observe pictorial sequences of events depicting beliefs and desires
(Meinhardt et al., 2012; Geangu et al., 2013; Ku¨hn-Popp et al., 2013).
Consistent with previous research, these passive studies have found a
widely distributed LSW, which suggests that implicit monitoring of
others’ beliefs continues even in the absence of an explicit instruction
to monitor mental states.
In contrast to these previous studies, this study tested participants’
understanding of FBs as they read narratives that described a story
character having a true or FB about the location of an object. Thus,
we employed an anomaly detection reading paradigm while recording
ERPs (i.e. the character looks for the object in the belief consistent or
inconsistent location), which aimed to exploit the brain’s clear sensi-
tivity to stimulus predictability and semantic integration processes
during language comprehension; the N400 effect (Kutas and
Hillyard, 1980; Lau et al., 2013). This component is a centroparietally
distributed, negative-going deflection in the ERP, which peaks ap-
proximately 400 ms after word-onset. Extensive research in psycholin-
guistics and cognitive neuroscience has shown that the amplitude of
this ERP component is directly influenced by inconsistencies of both
local and contextual information (e.g. Van Berkum et al., 2003;
Hagoort et al., 2004). Moreover, typical N400 responses to local se-
mantic anomalies (e.g. the peanut was in love) have been shown to
reverse within an appropriate discourse context (Nieuwland and Van
Berkum, 2006; Nieuwland and Martin, 2012; Filik and Leuthold, 2013;
Nieuwland, 2013). Similar N400 effects are activated when a narrative
describes a character’s inappropriate emotional response to a given
social situation (Leuthold et al., 2012), or when a statement conflicts
with a person’s moral values (Van Berkum et al., 2009). Here, we aim
to establish for the first time whether the brain is sensitive to incon-
sistencies of other peoples’ actions when they violate their beliefs, or
whether the reader’s own knowledge of events has a stronger influence
on incremental processing. Thus, we compare N400 responses to
belief-consistent and inconsistent events under true belief and FB con-
ditions, which is expected to reveal listeners’ preferred interpretations
of the unfolding discourse in the earliest moments of processing.
Importantly, this passive reading paradigm allowed us to examine
the brain’s immediate sensitivity to information that is consistent/in-
consistent with beliefs, without making inferences about others’ mental
states an explicit part of the reader’s task.
We recorded ERPs while participants read short narratives in which
a character’s (mistaken) belief conflicts with the participants’ own
knowledge about reality. An example of an FB scenario is shown in
(1) where reality and the beliefs of the story character are in direct
conflict with one another.
(1) Gillian cooked a casserole and left it to cool down in the oven.
While Gillian was not looking, Mark moved the casserole to the
fridge. When Gillian wanted to eat the casserole, she looked in the
fridge.
In this example, context suggests that Gillian won’t know that the
casserole has moved from the oven to the fridge (she was not looking
while that happened), so her reported actions (she looked in the fridge)
are inconsistent with her beliefs. As described above, previous research
has demonstrated that people are sensitive to others’ beliefs even with-
out being given an explicit instruction to track their mental states (e.g.
Ferguson and Breheny, 2012; Schneider et al., 2012; Geangu et al.,
2013). Thus, if readers have already established a representation of
the character’s FB based on the prior context, then some processing
difficulty should be revealed when readers encounter the belief-incon-
sistent critical word (fridge). In line with the N400 literature described
above, it is expected that such a difficulty will be reflected in an
increased N400 effect following inconsistent words compared with
consistent words (i.e. oven for the given example). However, if readers
have not fully accommodated the character’s FB, they may process the
incoming information egocentrically (i.e. biased to their own know-
ledge of reality), and instead show an increased N400 effect for the
belief-consistent (but reality-inconsistent) word compared with the
belief-inconsistent word. For comparison, ‘true belief’ passages where
the character explicitly saw the object get moved (e.g. ‘Gillian spotted
Mark move the casserole . . .’) were included as a baseline of contextual
anomaly detection, where we expect to see similar N400 effects for the
inconsistent information based on readers’ knowledge of narrative
reality. Finally, if ability to integrate others’ beliefs online is modulated
by one’s ability to empathize with others, then we expect to see a larger
inconsistency detection response on FB trials in individuals with high
levels of empathy compared with those with low levels of empathy.
Here, we use the Empathy Quotient questionnaire (Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright, 2004) as a measure of social aptitude, which indexes
‘global empathy’, including both cognitive empathy and emotional
reactivity (Lawrence et al., 2004).
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-eight native English speakers from the University of Kent took
part in this study (Mage¼ 20, SDage¼ 3.9), and were either paid for
participating or received course credits. Of these, 20 were females, and
25 were right-handed [handedness was measured using the Oldfield
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971)]. Participants did
not have dyslexia and had vision that they reported to be normal or
corrected-to-normal. All participants were naı¨ve to the purpose of the
study.
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Materials and design
One hundred and forty experimental items were created as in Table 1.
Each item consisted of three sentences: Sentence one introduced a
character and described that character putting a target object in a
given location. Sentence two described a second character moving
the target object to a new location. This action was either ‘explicitly
observed’ or ‘missed’ by the first character, creating a true or FB re-
garding the object’s location for that character, respectively (e.g. ‘Later,
Janet saw Barry move the . . .’, vs ‘While Janet was busy, Barry moved
the . . .’). A final third sentence described the first character looking for
the object, and thus drew reference to a location that was either con-
sistent or inconsistent with their TB or FB (e.g. ‘When Janet wanted to
see the painting, she looked in the kitchen/hall’). This resulted in a 2
(belief: true vs false) 2 consistency: consistent vs inconsistent) within
subjects design. Note that reality-violating locations are congruent in
an FB context, and vice-versa.
Experimental items were tested using a pre-test for cloze probability
using an online questionnaire platform (Qualtrics). This allowed us to
ensure that adult participants would correctly predict the belief appro-
priate location for both TB and FB conditions, and to test whether
offline differences in this ability existed. Twenty-two students from the
University of Kent completed the pre-test, which consisted of 10 pas-
sages depicting a character with a TB, and 10 passages depicting a
character with an FB (two counterbalanced lists meant that 11 partici-
pants completed each list, with one version of each item appearing in
each list). Items were presented one at a time, truncated before the
final critical word, and participants were instructed to complete the
sentence with the first sensible word coming to mind. Cloze probability
was computed as the percentage of trials that elicited the intended
consistent or inconsistent critical words. Mean cloze probability
scores for the consistent word in each condition revealed high accuracy
and no significant difference between TB (M¼ 0.96, SD¼ 0.07) and FB
(M¼ 0.94, SD¼ 13; t(21)¼ 0.64, P¼ 0.53) contexts. In addition, low-
level properties of the sentence-final critical words were matched ac-
cording to word length, log-frequency and familiarity (using the MRC
Psycholinguistics Database; Wilson, 1988). Statistical comparisons be-
tween conditions found no significant differences in any of these meas-
ures (All ts <1; see Table 2 for mean values on each measure).
Four presentation lists were then created, with each list containing
140 experimental items, 35 in each of the four conditions. The 140
experimental items in each list were interspersed randomly among 68
unrelated filler sentences to create a single random order and each
subject only saw each target sentence once, in one of the four condi-
tions. Seven participants were randomly assigned to read each list.
All participants also completed the Empathy Quotient questionnaire
(Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004), as a measure of social
aptitude. The empathy questionnaire contains 40 statements (e.g. ‘I
can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a conversation’), and
participants indicated the degree to which each statement relates to
them (on a 4-point scale: ‘strongly agree’, ‘slightly agree’, ‘slightly dis-
agree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. Each participant received a score on a
scale of 0–80, using a scoring key designed by Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright (2004), where a low score indicates low levels of empathy
and a high score indicates high levels of empathy. Participant scores in
the current sample averaged 44.4 and ranged from 21 to 68.
Procedure
Participants were informed about the electroencephalographic (EEG)
procedure and experimental task. After electrode application they were
seated in a booth where they read the materials from a computer
screen. There were four practice trials to familiarize them with the
procedure, after which the experimenter answered any questions.
Each trial began with the presentation of a single centrally located
red fixation cross for 500 ms to signal the start of a new trial. After
this time, a white fixation cross appeared for 500 ms. Next, the first two
context sentences were presented on the screen, and participants were
instructed to read these sentences and press spacebar on a keyboard to
continue when ready. A blank screen appeared for 500 ms, followed by
a fixation cross (500 ms). The third target sentence was then presented
word-by-word, with each word appearing at the centre of the screen
for 300 ms, with a 200-ms blank-screen interval between words. Target
words were always sentence final, and thus appeared with a full stop. A
2500-ms blank-screen interval followed each item. As recommended
by Van Berkum (2004, 2012), there was no secondary task to verify
attention, since secondary tasks have the potential to recruit their own
brain responses that might interfere with the brain activity under
examination. Trials appeared in eight blocks of 26 trials. Each block
was separated by a break, the duration of which was determined by the
participant. At the end of the main EEG task, participants completed
the Empathy Quotient questionnaire. Thus, participants were tested in
a single session that lasted approximately 1 h, during which they were
seated in a comfortable chair located in an isolated room.
Electrophysiological measures
A Brain Vision Quickamp amplifier system was used with an ActiCap
cap for continuous recording of EEG activity from 62 active electrodes
over midline electrodes Fz, Cz, CPz, Pz, POz and Oz, over the left
hemisphere from electrodes Fp1, AF3, AF7, F1, F3, F5, F7, FC1, FC3,
FC5, FC7, C1 C3, C5, T7, CP1, CP3, CP5, TP7, A1, P1, P3, P5, P7,
PO3, PO7, PO9, O1 and from the homologue electrodes over the right
hemisphere. EEG and EOG recordings were sampled at 1000 Hz, and
electrode impedance was kept below 10 k. Off-line, all EEG channels
were recalculated to an average mastoid reference.
Prior to segmentation, EEG and EOG activity was band-pass filtered
(0.01–30 Hz, 12 dB/oct), and EEG activity containing blinks was
Table 1 Example experimental item in each of the four conditions
TB
Consistent
Janet unpacked the belongings and put the painting in the hall.
Later, Janet saw Barry move the painting to the kitchen. When
Janet wanted to see the painting, she looked in the kitchen.
Inconsistent
Janet unpacked the belongings and put the painting in the hall.
Later, Janet saw Barry move the painting to the kitchen. When
Janet wanted to see the painting, she looked in the hall.
FB
Consistent
Janet unpacked the belongings and put the painting in the hall.
While Janet was busy, Barry moved the painting to the kitchen.
When Janet wanted to see the painting, she looked in the hall.
Inconsistent
Janet unpacked the belongings and put the painting in the hall.
While Janet was busy, Barry moved the painting to the kitchen.
When Janet wanted to see the painting, she looked in the kitchen.
Critical words are underlined for exposition only
Table 2 Mean pre-test ratings per condition for the final set of experimental items
TB FB
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
Cloze probability 0.96 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08) 0.94 (0.13) 0.06 (0.13)
Word length 5.9 (2.0) 6 (1.7) 6 (1.7) 5.9 (2.0)
Word frequency (log) 2.89 (1.5) 3.22 (1.6) 3.22 (1.6) 2.89 (1.5)
Word familiarity 549.7 (57.6) 560.7 (54.0) 560.7 (54.0) 549.7 (57.6)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
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corrected using a semi-automatic ocular ICA correction approach
(Brain Vision Analyzer 2). The continuous EEG record was then seg-
mented into epochs of 1200 ms, starting 200 ms prior to the onset of
the target word. Thus, the post-stimulus epoch lasted for a total dur-
ation of 1000 ms. Semi-automatic artefact detection software (Brain
Vision Analyzer 2) was run, to identify and discard trials with non-
ocular artefacts (drifts, channel blockings, EEG activity
exceeding 75V). This procedure resulted in an average trial-loss
of 6.5% per condition.
ERP data analysis
For analysis of the EEG data, the signal at each electrode site was
averaged separately for each experimental condition time-locked to
the onset of the target word. Before the measurement of ERP param-
eters, the waveforms were aligned to a 200-ms baseline prior to the
onset of the target word. To analyze experimental effects on the N400,
mean ERP amplitude was determined in the time interval from 250 to
400 ms relative to target word onset.
ERP amplitudes over lateral electrodes were analysed using four
regions of interest (ROIs). Given the broad distribution of the N400,
and in line with recent analyses of narrative comprehension (e.g.
Nieuwland, 2013), electrodes were divided along a left–right dimen-
sion, and an anterior–posterior dimension. The two ROIs over the left
hemisphere were: left-anterior (Fp1, AF3, AF7, F1, F3, F5, F7, FC1,
FC3, FC5, FT7), and left-posterior (CP1, CP3, CP5, TP7, P1, P3, P5,
P7, PO3, PO7, O1); two homologue ROIs were defined for the right
hemisphere. ERP amplitudes over midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, CPz, Pz,
POz, Oz), where the N400 is maximal, were analysed separately from
data recorded over lateral electrode sites.
For the statistical analysis of the N400 in each condition, an ANOVA
was performed over lateral electrodes with variables belief (true vs false),
consistency (consistent vs inconsistent), hemisphere (left vs right) and
ant-pos (anterior vs posterior). ERP amplitudes over midline electrodes
Fz
Cz
Pz
ms-200 0 200 400 600 800
µV
1
2
3
4
5
ms-200 0 200 400 600 800
µV
1
2
3
4
5
ms-200 0 200 400 600 800
µV
1
2
3
4
5
TB consistent
TB inconsistent
FB consistent
FB inconsistent
N400 
Fig. 1 Grand average ERPs over midline electrodes elicited by critical words in the target sentence for each of the four conditions. Note that negativity is plotted upwards.
Empathy predicts false belief reasoning SCAN (2015) 851
were analysed using a belief (true vs false) consistency (consistent vs
inconsistent) electrode (Fz, Cz, CPz, Pz, POz, Oz) ANOVA. To exam-
ine the effect of individual differences in empathy on belief understand-
ing, Pearson’s correlations were performed comparing participants’
empathy scores with the ‘inconsistency effect’ for TB and FB conditions
separately. The ‘inconsistency effect’ was calculated by subtracting the
N400 amplitude for the consistent condition from the N400 amplitude
for the inconsistent condition between 250 and 400 ms post-target word
onset, over all electrode sites. Thus, a negative score indicates a larger
N400 effect for the inconsistent compared with consistent condition
(i.e. appropriate anomaly detection), and a positive score indicates a
large effect for the consistent compared with inconsistent condition (i.e.
interpreting events egocentrically in FB contexts).
RESULTS
N400 effect analyses
Grand average ERP waveforms over three midline electrodes (Fz, Cz
and Pz) are presented in Figure 1. It can be seen that following a TB
context, inconsistent target words triggered a more negative-going de-
flection (N400) than consistent target words, starting between 200 and
250 ms after critical word onset. In contrast, this pattern appears to be
reversed for the FB condition, with consistent target words eliciting a
slightly more negative-going N400 component within the same time
window following target word onset.
Analysis of the N400 amplitude over lateral electrodes in the
250–400 ms time interval revealed a main effect of belief [F(1,
27)¼ 5.75, P< 0.03, p2¼ 0.18], such that overall, ERP waveforms
were more negative-going for true belief contexts compared with FB
context (2.29 vs 2.82 mV). Moreover, there was a belief * consistency
interaction [F(1, 27)¼ 13.68, P< 0.001, p2¼ 0.34], which also ap-
peared in a three-way interaction with ant-pos [F(1, 27)¼ 7.49,
P< 0.01, p
2¼ 0.22]. To examine these effects further we conducted
simple main effects analyses to compare the consistency effects at each
context level, separately for anterior and posterior electrode sites.
Results at anterior sites revealed no significant difference between TB
consistent and inconsistent conditions (t(27)¼ 1.04, P¼ 0.31), or be-
tween FB consistent and inconsistent conditions (t(27)¼1.97,
P¼ 0.06). In contrast, at posterior sites (where the N400 is typically
maximal), a clear effect of consistency emerged for both true belief
(t(27)¼ 4.36, P< 0.001) and FB (t(27)¼2.51, P< 0.02) context con-
ditions. In the TB condition, this reflected the expected increased N400
amplitude following a belief-inconsistent target word compared with a
belief-consistent target word (2.06 vs 3.38mV). However, in the FB
condition, the N400 amplitude was largest following a belief-consistent
target word compared with a belief-inconsistent target word (2.77 vs
3.65mV).
Over midline electrodes, the main effect of belief was again signifi-
cant [F(1, 27)¼ 5.22, P< 0.03, p2¼ 0.16], reflecting a more negative-
going ERP waveform for TB contexts compared with FB contexts (2.57
vs 3.24mV). In addition, the interaction between belief and consistency
was significant [F(1, 27)¼ 15.84, P< 0.001, p2¼ 0.37]. Simple main
effects analyses compared the consistency effects at each context level,
and revealed that while the TB context elicited a larger N400 for in-
consistent vs consistent target words (t(27)¼ 3.33, P< 0.003; 1.93 vs
3.21mV), the FB context elicited the reverse pattern, with a larger N400
for consistent vs inconsistent target words (t(27)¼3.05, P< 0.005;
2.61 vs 3.87mV). Scalp topographies of the consistency effect in each
condition are shown in Figure 2.
Correlations with empathy
Correlations compared participants’ empathy scores with the ampli-
tude and valence of the ‘inconsistency effect’ for TB and FB conditions
separately. This data can be seen in Figure 3. Recall that a negative
N400 effect typically reflects lower expectancy, or difficulty integrating
a word into the wider context, thus a negative score indicates a larger
N400 effect for the inconsistent compared with consistent condition
(i.e. appropriate anomaly detection), and a positive score indicates a
large effect for the consistent compared with inconsistent condition
(i.e. interpreting events egocentrically in FB contexts). In the TB con-
dition, there was no correlation between empathy and the inconsist-
ency effect [r(26)¼ 0.03, P¼ 0.43], demonstrating that empathy does
not predict the detection of inconsistencies within a true context. In
contrast, a significant negative relationship between empathy score and
direction of the N400 inconsistency effect was found in the FB condi-
tion [r(26)¼0.51, P< 0.005]. This suggests that individuals with
lower empathy scores interpret unfolding events egocentrically, but
individuals with higher empathy scores are more likely to successfully
interpret events according to the character’s beliefs (thus showing an
appropriately larger N400 response to the FB inconsistent condition
compared with the consistent condition), possibly alongside an inter-
pretation of events according to reality. A comparison of the slopes for
TB and FB conditions (Steiger, 1980) revealed a marginal difference
between the correlation slopes (z¼ 1.6, P¼ 0.11). Considered within
the context of a significant empathy-inconsistency correlation effect for
FB but not TB contexts, this shows that while the slopes are in the same
direction, there is some difference in the magnitude of the relationship
when directly compared.
DISCUSSION
Understanding others’ beliefs frequently requires the comprehender to
represent a version of the world that is inconsistent with their own
TB inconsistent minus  
TB consistent 
FB inconsistent minus 
FB consistent 
250 - 300 ms
300 - 350 ms
350 - 400 ms
250 - 300 ms
300 - 350 ms
350 - 400 ms
-2µV 0µV 2µV -2µV 0µV 2µV
Fig. 2 Topographic maps of the ERP difference waveform for each belief context condition (incon-
sistent minus consistent) between 250 and 400 ms from critical word onset.
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knowledge of reality. However, rapid dissociation of these two types of
information is important for successful everyday communication,
otherwise our own knowledge of reality would become confounded
with others peoples’ beliefs. In this article, we report the results of an
ERP experiment whereby participants read narratives that described a
story character having a TB or FB about the location of an object, and
manipulated the consistency of their actions based on this belief. By
comparing N400 responses to belief-consistent and inconsistent events
under TB and FB conditions, we aimed to investigate for the first time
whether the brain’s response is sensitive to violations of another per-
son’s mind, or whether the reader’s own knowledge of reality has a
stronger influence on incremental processing. Subsequent analyses
examined the degree to which individual differences among partici-
pants influence this response by assessing how one’s ability to
empathize with others modulates the ability to integrate others’ beliefs
online.
Results showed that when the character held a TB about the object’s
location, the N400 was more negative-going for belief inconsistent vs
belief consistent location nouns. This finding fits with previous re-
search, which has shown that readers are sensitive to discourse-level
inconsistencies, even when that information fits the sentence on a local
level (i.e. the local sentence is grammatical and semantically correct;
e.g. Van Berkum et al., 2003; Camblin et al., 2007). This demonstrates
that our readers were correctly considering the wider discourse context
at the point that they integrated the character’s actions. However, note
that in this TB condition, the reader’s and the character’s beliefs were
aligned with reality, thus no interference was present to disrupt pro-
cessing (except possibly a memory trace of the object in its initial
location). Moreover, readers could correctly integrate the character’s
actions based on their own knowledge about reality, without consid-
eration of the character’s beliefs. Therefore, in order to test readers’
ability to interpret unfolding events according to the character’s beliefs,
we must focus on their responses when the character held an FB about
the object’s location.
The reverse pattern of effects was found when the character held an
FB about the object’s location; the N400 was more negative-going for
belief consistent vs belief inconsistent location nouns. This suggests
that readers do not immediately integrate the character’s beliefs, but
instead initially rely on their own egocentric knowledge of the object’s
true location when processing described events. This finding fits with
previous suggestions of an initial egocentric bias or ‘pull of reality’ in
ToM use (Mitchell et al., 1996; Keysar et al., 2000; Birch and Bloom,
2004, 2007; Ferguson and Breheny, 2012), whereby knowledge of the
object’s actual location delayed readers’ access to the belief inference.
Nevertheless, in a separate offline sentence completion task, partici-
pants were 94% accurate in stating the correct FB-appropriate loca-
tion, showing no difference in accuracy compared with the TB
condition. This suggests that readers can make the appropriate infer-
ence about a character’s actions based on their beliefs when sufficient
time is available, despite the initial interpretation of events relying on
one’s own knowledge.
However, further analyses revealed that individual differences in
empathy influenced the magnitude, and to some degree the direction,
of this inconsistency effect in the FB condition (but not the TB con-
dition), therefore showing differences in the perspective preferences
that readers adopt while interpreting narratives about (false) beliefs.
Here, correlation analyses revealed that individuals with high levels of
empathy were able to rapidly integrate contextual information about
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Fig. 3 Correlation between individuals’ empathy quotient scores and the N400 inconsistency effect for TB and FB conditions. The N400 inconsistency effect is calculated as the difference in N400 amplitude
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Empathy predicts false belief reasoning SCAN (2015) 853
the character’s beliefs and subsequently processed incoming informa-
tion in terms of that belief (i.e. showed a more negative N400 for FB
inconsistent vs consistent location nouns) alongside their own infer-
ence based on knowledge of reality (as reflected in inconsistency effects
around zero). In contrast, individuals with low levels of empathy pre-
dominantly interpreted events in terms of their real world knowledge.
Note that due to the relatively small sample size used here (N¼ 28),
statistical comparison between low and high empathizers (using a
median split) was not possible. The lack of a correlation in the TB
condition demonstrates that empathy does not simply enhance one’s
general language comprehension skills, but that it relates specifically to
one’s ability to infer and use ToM online.
This study is the first to show that empathy is related to the degree
to which people experience intrusions from their own knowledge/real-
ity online. Such a relationship makes sense given that both FB reason-
ing and empathy recruit-related processes of perspective-taking (i.e.
understanding and predicting events in terms of other peoples’
mental statesincluding their knowledge or emotional state). Indeed,
both the ability to infer FBs and the ability to empathize with others
recruit overlapping executive skills, including inhibition (of one’s own
mental state) and working memory (to represent the multiple mental
states). This relationship between empathy and beliefs demonstrates
that an egocentric or reality bias is not a default process in ToM use,
and that such biases can be overridden when other peoples’ perspec-
tives are more appropriate for understanding and the comprehender
possesses sufficient social and cognitive skills to inhibit this bias (see
German and Hehman, 2006; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Lin et al., 2010;
Brunye et al., 2012; Kessler and Wang, 2012). Whilst these findings
show clear evidence of a relationship between empathy and the use of
ToM online, we cannot assume a causal role; it is equally plausible that
increased ToM use leads to increased empathy or that greater empathy
leads to increased ToM use. Further research is needed to establish the
existence and nature of such a causal relationship between empathy
and ToM, and to understand the mechanisms that might underlie this
relationship.
Taken together, these results demonstrate that when an individual’s
social skills are high the brain can be immediately sensitive to viola-
tions of other peoples’ mental states, specifically their beliefs, and this
can modulate the amplitude of the N400 effect, which is typically
associated with stimulus predictability and semantic integration pro-
cesses during language comprehension. It is interesting to note that
this modulation occurred even in a passive reading task such as this
where ToM use was not an explicit part of the task, and in fact did not
benefit participants (cf. Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004;
Wang et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2009). Although modulating a different
ERP component (due to task differences), this finding fits with recent
studies that have examined ToM under implicit conditions, and have
reported evidence of implicit monitoring of others’ beliefs without
explicit instructions to track others’ mental states (Meinhardt et al.,
2012; Geangu et al., 2013; Ku¨hn-Popp et al., 2013).
In conclusion, when a character’s described actions are inconsistent
with respect to their TB about reality this rapidly elicits processing
difficulties during reading, as revealed by an enhanced N400 anomaly
detection brain response. More interesting is the finding that when
readers experience a conflict between their own knowledge of reality
and a character’s FB, processing can be biased towards either the reality
or belief-appropriate interpretation, depending on an aspect of indi-
viduals’ social competence (i.e. empathy). Specifically, high
empathizers successfully interpreted events according to the character’s
FBs (possibly alongside their own knowledge of reality), but low
empathizers relied on their egocentric knowledge and therefore did
not initially use the character’s belief to interpret unfolding events.
This study demonstrates the benefits of employing implicit ToM
tasks and online measures in healthy adult populations, and brings
to the broad field of ToM a new reading paradigm for studying
mutual knowledge/common ground phenomena. Finally, this study
is the first to demonstrate the effect of empathy in adult online FB
understanding, and therefore illustrates the importance of considering
individual differences when assessing ToM.
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